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Abstract—Demand response is widely employed by today’s
data centers to reduce energy consumption in response to the
increasing of electricity cost. To incentivize users of data centers
participate in the demand response programs, i.e., breaking the
“split incentive” hurdle, some prior researches propose market-
based mechanisms such as dynamic pricing and static monetary
rewards. However, these mechanisms are either intrusive or
unfair. In this paper, we use time-varying rewards to incentivize
users, who have flexible deadlines and are willing to trading
performance degradation for monetary rewards, grant time-
shifting of their requests. With a game-theoretic framework,
we model the game between a single data center and its users.
Further, we extend our design via integrating it with two other
emerging practical demand response strategies: server shutdown
and local renewable energy generation. With real-world data
traces, we show that a DC with our design can effectively shed its
peak electricity load and overall electricity cost without reducing
its profit, when comparing it with the current practice where no
incentive mechanism is established.
I. INTRODUCTION
Several Demand Response (DR) strategies for Data Centers
(DCs) emerged recently, such as time-shifting of workloads
[1]. They can effectively reduce/defer a DC’s electricity load
at specified time in response to the increasing of electricity
cost [2]. For example, most of today’s DCs need to pay both
energy and demand charge, where the demand charge is the
cost of the DC’s peak electricity load during a billing cycle. In
this case, the DCs can shed their demand charges via deferring
part of the electricity load from peak hour to off-peak hour
[3].
Inevitably, most DR strategies, especially the ones who need
workload management, will lead to performance degradation
[4]. For example, time-shifting of workloads can greatly
increase the latency of service [5]. Naturally, users of DCs
are not tend to participate in these DR programs if they are
not well incentivized [6]. However, today’s DCs usually charge
their users via flat-rate based pricing or usage based pricing.
Namely, the cost of a user is decided based on the total usage
of DC resources, regardless of when the DC resources are
utilized [7]. In this case, users do not share the same incentive
as the DCs to participate in specified DR programs, which is
referred to as “split incentive” [8].
In this paper, we aim at designing a market-based mech-
anism for a single DC to break the “split incentive” hurdle,
which holds the following characteristics:
• Monetary incentive: It provides users of DC with incen-
tives to participate in specified DR programs.
• Non-intrusiveness: The DR programs are fully voluntary
and the costs and performances of users, who decide not
to participate in the DR programs, are not effected.
• Deadline awareness: All users’ requests are processed
before their deadlines.
• Fair reward system: Only if one participates in the DR
programs can gain monetary reward and the reward is
proportional to the user’s contribution to the DR pro-
grams.
• Simplicity and max-cost guarantee: The pricing policy,
which is used to charge users of DC, should be easy to
understand. Meanwhile, it can guarantee that a user’s cost
for the DC services will not exceed the baseline cost.
Note, we assume that every user was previously charged via
a commonly-applied pricing policy, e.g., usage based pricing
[7], and the corresponding cost is referred to as baseline cost.
We use time-varying rewards, on top of the commonly
applied pricing policy such as flat-rate based pricing or usage
based pricing, to incentivize users of DCs grant time-shifting
of their requests for DR. With our design, users, who have
tight deadlines and/or are not interested in trading performance
degradation for monetary rewards, will be charged by the orig-
inal pricing policy, and their requests will never be deferred.
Namely, it is non-intrusive and deadline aware. Meanwhile,
we only reward users, whose requests are deferred, and the
reward is proportional to the amounts of requests being de-
ferred. Thus, our reward system is fair. Moreover, our pricing
policy and reward system can be easily understand and users’
maximum costs with our design will never exceed the baseline
costs.
With our design, the DC needs to make a suitable trade-
off between workload management flexibility and monetary
reward. Namely, via giving users higher rewards, the users are
more likely to allow the DC to time-shift their requests. On
the contrary, if the rewards are relatively low, the DC has less
flexibility to response to the electricity price signals. The key
contributions of this paper are listed as follows:
• We propose a non-intrusive and fair reward system to in-
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centivize users with flexible deadlines grant time-shifting
of their requests. In this case, the DC has more workload
management flexibility to manage its electricity load and
thus reduce its electricity cost.
• With a game-theoretic framework, we model the game
between the DC and its users. We first study users’
dominant strategies for deciding whether to join in the
DR programs. Then, DC’s optimal choices of the time-
varying rewards are deduced. Specifically, the DC aims
at minimizing its electricity cost without reducing of its
profit and the problem of electricity cost minimization is
formulated via a convex program.
• We extend our design via integrating it with each one
of the two emerging practical DR strategies: server shut-
down [8]–[10] and local renewable energy generation [6],
[11], [12]. Therefore, our design can apply to different
combinations of DR strategies.
In the rest of the paper, we first outline several prior work
about using market-based mechanisms to incentivize users of
DCs participate in the DR programs in section II. In section
III, user’s surplus and DC’s profit are formulated. We model
the game between users and DC in section IV and extend our
design in section V. We evaluate our design with real-world
data traces and conclude this paper in section VI and VII,
respectively.
II. RELATED WORKS
With specified DR programs, DC can effectively reduce its
electricity load [4], as well as the demand charge and the
overall electricity cost [3], [13]. Considering that most DR
strategies involve management of users’ workloads, e.g., time-
shifting of requests, several market-based mechanisms have
been proposed to incentivize users grant workload manage-
ment [6], [8], [14]–[16].
[6] propagated the overall electricity cost onto the users’
costs via charging users by Time-of-Use (ToU) pricing.
Namely, at each period of time, the price of an instance
of DC, i.e., a combination of DC resources such as CPU,
memory and storage, is set to be proportional to the prediction
of the DC’s electricity load. With this pricing policy, users,
who can tolerate performance degradation and are sensitive to
price, may reduce their purchases of instances at peak hour in
response to the increasing of cost. In this case, the DC’s peak
electricity load and its demand charge can be reduced.
[14] fairly distributed a DC’s overall electricity cost among
its users. With [14]’s design, if the DC’s electricity cost is
mainly decided by its peak electricity load, users of the DC
can gain considerable cost reduction via reducing its demand
when an overall peak occurs. Thus, users are well incentivized
to participate in the DR programs to shed the DC’s peak
electricity load.
However, both [6] and [14] are intrusive since the costs of
all users are effected regardless of whether they are interested
in participating in the DR programs. Meanwhile, they do not
guarantee that the cost of a user with their designs will never
exceed the baseline cost.
[8] proposed Usage-based Pricing with Monetary Reward
(UPMR). [8]’s mechanism is non-intrusive and can provide
max-cost guarantee. At the beginning of each billing cycle,
DC releases the reward function to its users. Then, each user
can make the decision of whether to join the DR programs
in the upcoming billing cycle based on the reward function
and its sensitivity to the performance degradation. The key
difference between [8]’s work and our design is that: the
monetary reward offered by [8] is static, i.e., it will remain
unchanged during a billing cycle, and the reward is given to
all users, who are willing to participate in the DR programs,
regardless of whether their workloads are modified for DR.
Thus, [8]’s reward system is not fair. On the contrary, In this
paper, we provide users with time-varying monetary rewards
and users can change their decisions of whether to join the DR
programs during a billing cycle based on the real-time reward.
In this case, the amount of users, who have joined in the DR
programs, is time-varying, and thus the DC embraces more
load flexibility. Moreover, the reward given to each user with
our design is proportional to the user’s contribution to the DR
program, i.e., the amount of requests being deferred, which is
more fair.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A time-slotted system is used in this paper. Namely, we
divide a billing cycle into τ time slots, with equally length
of T (hour). In this section, we formulate a user’s surplus, as
well as a DC’s profit.
A. User’s Surplus
Let Vi[t] denote the net utility can be gained by user i after
processing one of its request generated at time slot t without
participating in any DR programs, where i ∈ {1, · · · , I}
denotes the index for users and t ∈ {1, · · · , τ} denotes
the index for time slots. Here, I denotes the number of
active users. Let δi[t] ($) denote the average baseline cost
for processing one request generated by user i at time slot
t. Further, let κi[t] and γ[t] denote the net utility loss and
financial reward caused by modifying one of user i’s request
generated at time slot t, respectively.
We formulate user i’s surplus after processing one of its
request generated at time slot t, which is denoted by Si[t], as
below:
Si[t] = Vi[t]− δi[t] + 1i[t](γ[t]− κi[t]), (1)
where 1i[t] is a binary variable and indicates whether the
request is modified for DR. Namely, if 1i[t] = 1, the request
is modified, and thus user i will loss κi[t] net utility but enjoy
γ[t] monetary reward. On the contrary, if 1i[t] = 0, the request
has not been modified and thus no net utility is lost and no
reward is given.
B. DC’s Profit
Revenue: Suppose that the DC’s revenue is constituted by
all of its active users’ baseline costs. Thus, we formulate the
DC’s revenue over a billing cycle via
Revenue =
τ∑
t=1
I∑
i=1
λi[t]δi[t], (2)
where λi[t] denotes the amount of requests generated by user
i at time slot t.
Electricity cost: The electricity cost of today’s DC is
usually constituted by two parts: energy charge and demand
charge, where energy charge is decided by the DC’s total
energy consumption and demand charge is computed based
on the DC’s peak electricity load. Specifically, the demand
charge can weigh heavily on a DC’s overall electricity cost
[13], [17]. Let α[t] ($/KWh) denote the price of energy charge
at time slot t and βj ($/KW) denote the price of type-j demand
charge. Here, j ∈ {1, · · · , J} is the index for types of demand
charge and J measures the total types of demand charge. For
example, in [3], the authors divided the whole billing cycle
into on-peak and off-peak periods and the prices of demand
charge during on-peak and off-peak periods can be different.
Therefore, we formulate the DC’s electricity cost over a billing
cycle via
Cost =
τ∑
t=1
Tα[t]P [t] +
J∑
j=1
max
t∈Aj
βjP [t], (3)
where Aj denotes the periods of time falling into the type-j
demand charge window. Here, P [t] (KW) denotes the average
electricity load of the DC at time slot t.
Like in [9], the average electricity load of the DC at time
slot t is formulated as
P [t] = Epue[t]
N∑
n=1
(e0 + un[t]e1), (4)
where Epue[t] denotes the average ratio of overall DC energy
consumption to IT energy usage at time slot t, n ∈ {1, · · · , N}
is the index for active servers, N denotes the total amount of
active servers, e0 (KW) denotes the power of an idle server,
e1 (KW) measures the increase of power of a server with unit
increase in CPU utilization and un[t] denotes the average CPU
utilization of server n at time slot t.
Without loss of generality, we assume that each request
needs the same amount of DC resources to be fully processed
and each server can handle the same amount of requests
within a time slot. Meanwhile, according to [18], the optimal
workload dispatching rule is to distribute all requests equally
on all active servers. Thus, we formulate the average CPU
utilization ratio of server n at time slot t via
un[t] =
λˆ[t]
Nν
, (5)
where λˆ[t] denotes the aggregate requests scheduled at time
slot t and ν denotes the maximum amount of requests can
be processed by a server within a time slot in fully utilized
condition.
We use time-shifting of users’ requests in this paper to shed
the DC’s peak electricity load. Let D denote the maximum
Users Data Center
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Fig. 1. Outline of the interactions between users and DC.
length of deferrable periods of time. Namely, all requests
generated at time slot t should be scheduled no later than
time slot t + D. Let ηd[t] denote the aggregate requests
generated at time slot t and scheduled at time slot t + d,
where d ∈ {0, · · · , D} is the index for the amount of time
slots of request being deferred. Specifically, η0[t] measures
the amount of requests generated at time slot t and scheduled
at the same time slot, i.e., they are not deferred. On the
contrary,
∑D
d=1 ηd[t] measures the amount of deferred requests
generated at time slot t. Thus, we formulate the aggregate
requests scheduled at time slot t via
λˆ[t] =
D∑
d=0
ηd[t− d]. (6)
Reward: We give monetary rewards to users for allowing
deferring their requests and the rewards are proportional to the
amounts of requests being deferred. Thus, we formulate the
total amount of rewards given to the users over a billing cycle
via
Reward =
τ∑
t=1
γ[t]
D∑
d=1
ηd[t], (7)
Profit: We define the profit of the DC over a billing cycle
via
Profit = Revenue− Cost− Reward. (8)
Note, the DR programs have no impact on the Revenue term,
since it is fully constituted by the baseline costs. Thus, we
treat the Revenue term as a given constant in the rest of the
paper.
IV. GAME-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK
In this paper, we assume that the DC has perfect knowledge
of the aggregate requests in the upcoming billing cycle. A
game-theoretic framework is proposed for the DC to deduce
the optimal choices of rewards in this section. The interactions
between users and DC is shown in Fig. 1. At the beginning of
each time slot, DC first releases the reward information, i.e.,
γ[t], to users. Next, users answer whether they are willing to
allow DC to defer their requests generated at this time slot.
Finally, DC schedules users’ requests and rewards users whose
requests are deferred.
A. Users’ Dominant Strategies
Every user needs to make the decision of whether to allow
DC to defer its requests generated at the upcoming time slot
based on the reward, i.e., γ[t], and its sensitivity to time-
shifting of its requests, i.e., κi[t].
Assumption 1: Suppose every user is rational, which means
that it wants to maximize its surplus as defined in (1).
Assumption 2: Suppose that the DC holds an enormous
amount of users. In this case, each user’s contribution to the
DC’s overall electricity load is negligible, and thus every user
cannot strategically manipulate the price of DC services and
the rewards given to users. Namely, the users are price takers.
Theorem 1: From Assumption 1 and 2, ∀i, t, if the reward
exceeds the net utility loss caused by time-shifting of a user’s
requests, i.e., γ[t] > κi[t], the dominant strategy for the user
is to grant time-shifting of its requests. On the contrary, ∀i, t,
if γ[t] ≤ κi[t], the dominant strategy for the user is not to
participate in the DR programs.
The proof of Theorem A can be found in Appendix A.
B. DC’s Optimal Decisions
Variables: The DC needs to make two decisions at each
time slot: γ[t] and ηd[t]. Specifically, γ[t] is about the reward
given to users for granting time-shifting of their requests and
ηd[t] elaborates the detail of request distribution.
Constraints: First, we define the domain of the variables:
Lb[t] ≤ γ[t] ≤ Ub[t], ∀t, (9)
ηd[t] ≥ 0, ∀d, t, (10)
where Lb[t] and Ub[t] denote the lower bound and upper
bound of net utility loss factor, i.e., κi[t], of elastic users,
respectively. Here, the elastic users are the ones who have
flexible deadlines and are will allow DC to time-shift their
requests if they are well incentivized. On the contrary, the
users, who have tight deadlines or/and are not interested in
trading performance degradation for monetary rewards, are
referred to as the inelastic users. Specifically, for all inelastic
users, we let their net utility loss factor κi[t] to be infinity. In
this case, ∀γ[t] ∈ [0, Lb[t]], there is no user will join the DR
programs. Meanwhile, ∀γ[t] ∈ [Ub[t],∞), all elastic users are
willing to allow DC to time-shift their requests. Thus, in (9),
we indicate that the DC has no interest to set the reward lower
than Lb[t] or higher than Ub[t].
Second, the amount of requests scheduled at each time slot
should not exceed the capacity of the DC, which is formulated
as
D∑
d=0
ηd[t− d] ≤ Nν. (11)
With (11), we ensure that the average CPU utilization ratio of
each server of the DC defined by (5) will never exceed 1.
Third, all requests generated at each time slot should be
scheduled before the deadline, which is formulated as
D∑
d=0
ηd[t] = λ[t], ∀t, (12)
where λ[t] denotes the aggregate requests of users generated
at time slot t and
λ[t] =
I∑
i=1
λi[t], ∀t. (13)
Fourth, we notice that the uniform distribution is widely
used in economic models [19]. Thus, we assume that, ∀t,
the net utility loss factors κi[t] of elastic users are uniformly
distributed from Lb[t] to Ub[t]. Moreover, without loss of
generality, suppose that each user will generate the same
amount of requests at each time slot, i.e., ∀t and ∀i1, i2 ∈
{1, · · · , I}, λi1 [t] = λi2 [t]. From Theorem 1, we obtain that,
∀t, the amount of deferrable requests, i.e., the sum of requests
generated by users who grant time-shifting of their requests,
equals pi[t]λ[t] γ[t]−Lb[t]Ub[t]−Lb[t] , where pi[t] denotes the ratio of the
elastic users to the overall users at time slot t. Obviously, the
amount of requests being deferred should be no higher than
the sum of deferrable requests, which is modeled as
D∑
d=1
ηd[t] ≤ pi[t]λ[t] γ[t]− Lb[t]
Ub[t]− Lb[t] , ∀t. (14)
Last but not least, in this paper, we aim at minimizing the
electricity cost of the DC while ensuring that the profit with
our design is no less than the one without any DR programs
and incentive mechanisms, which is modeled as
Revenue−Cost−Reward ≥ Revenue−Baseline Cost, (15)
where the Revenue, Cost and Reward terms are defined by (2),
(3) and (7), respectively. Here, the Baseline Cost term is the
electricity cost of the DC if no DR strategy is implemented.
Correspondingly, there is also no reward given to the users.
Further, we simplify (15) and reformulate it as
Cost + Reward ≤ Baseline Cost. (16)
Minimization of electricity cost: We define the problem
of minimization of the DC’s electricity cost without reducing
its profit via
min
γ[t],ηd[t]
Cost
s.t. (9)− (12), (14), (16).
(17)
where the Cost term is defined in (3).
Apparently, problem (17) is not convex caused by the non-
convex term Reward (7).
Theorem 2: For any given ηd[t], γ∗[t], which is defined as
γ∗[t] =
(Ub[t]− Lb[t])∑Dd=1 ηd[t]
pi[t]λ[t]
+ Lb[t], ∀t, (18)
is one of the optimal choice of γ[t] of problem (17).
The proof of Theorem 2 can be found in Appendix B. From
Theorem 2, we let γ[t] = γ∗[t], ∀t. Further, we update the
problem (17) to be
min
ηd[t]
Cost
s.t. (10)− (12), (16).
(19)
Apparently, problem (19) is convex, which can be effectively
solved via a convex tool such as CVX [20].
V. EXTENSIONS
We extend our design via integrating workload time-shifting
with another emerging practical DR strategy: server shutdown
[8]–[10] or local renewable energy generation [6], [11], [12]
in this section.
A. Server Shutdown
Considering that the proportionality degree of today’s com-
mercial server is relatively low, e.g., an idle server can
consume over 85% of peak power [21], shutting down the
idle servers can save a huge amount of energy. In this paper,
we take into consideration the energy overhead and the wear-
and-tear cost caused by turning on/off servers as in [8]. In this
case, at each time slot, the DC also needs to decide how many
servers should be switched on/off, which is denoted by mon[t]
and moff [t], respectively.
As in [8], we define the electricity cost of the DC over a
billing cycle with server shutdown, which is denoted by CostS ,
as
CostS =
τ∑
t=1
α[t](TPs[t] + EpuePo[t])+
J∑
j=1
βj max
t∈Aj
(
Ps[t] +
EpuePo[t]
T
)
,
(20)
where Ps[t] and Po[t] denote the average electricity load of
the DC with server shutdown and the average energy overhead
of turning on/off servers at time slot t, respectively. Here,
both of the definitions of Ps[t] and Po[t] can be found in
[8]. Moreover, the wear-and-tear cost of servers over a billing
cycle, which is denoted by Wear, is also defined as in [8].
The problem of minimizing the DC’s electricity cost with
server shutdown without reducing its profit is modeled as
min
ηd[t],
mon[t],
moff [t]
CostS
s.t. (10), (12),
CostS + Reward + Wear ≤ Baseline Cost,
mon[t] ≥ 0, moff [t] ≥ 0, ∀t,
λˆ[t]
ν
≤ m[0] +
t∑
t′=1
(mon[t]−moff [t]) ≤ N, ∀t,
(21)
where m[0] denotes the amount of switched on servers at
the beginning of the billing cycle. Here, the last constraint
of problem (21) indicates that the amount of switched on
servers at each time slot should be large enough to handle all
scheduled requests, but no larger than the quantity of available
servers, which is denoted by N . Like problem (19), problem
(21) is also convex.
B. Local Renewable Energy Generation
Recently, many state-of-the-art DCs have invested heavily
to develop local renewable energy generation, such as Apple
and Google [4]. Let G[t] (KWh) denote the renewable energy
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Normalized results of a DC with our design: (a) Peak electricity
load, (b) Electricity cost.
generated at time slot t. As in [6], we assume that the
information of renewable energy can be perfectly predicted by
the DC and the part of renewable energy, which is not used
by the DC, is dropped. Thus, the electricity cost with local
renewable energy generation, which is referred to as CostR,
is defined by
CostR =
τ∑
t=1
α[t] [TP [t]−G[t]]++
J∑
j=1
βj max
t∈Aj
[
P [t]− G[t]
T
]+
,
(22)
where [x]+ represents the function max{x, 0}.
Next, we model the problem of minimization of the DC’s
electricity cost with local renewable energy generation without
reducing its profit via
min
ηd[t]
CostR
s.t. (10)− (12),
CostR + Reward ≤ Baseline Cost,
(23)
which is also convex.
VI. CASE STUDIES
Three real-world data traces are used in this paper to rep-
resent users’ requests: Gmail U.S., Gmaps U.S. and Youtube
U.S. from January 1, 2014 to January 31, 2014 [22]. According
to the electric rates of industrial power service offered by
South Carolina Electric and Gas [23], ∀t, let α[t] = $0.05207
per KWh, J = 1 and β1 = $15.59 per KW. Let T = 1 (hour)
and τ = 720. Namely, the billing cycle is 30 days basis. Let
e0 = 0.1 KW, e1 = 0.1 KW, ν = 20 and Epue = 1.2. ∀t, let
pi[t] = 0.5, Lb[t] = 10e−4 ($) and Lb[t] = 10e−3 ($). Next,
in this section, we first evaluate our work by comparing its
performance with the one without any incentive mechanisms,
which represents the current practice of DC and is referred
to as Baseline. Then, we study the impact of integrating our
design with another DR strategy on the reduction of peak
electricity load and overall electricity cost.
A. Performance Evaluation
We study the DC’s peak electricity load and electricity cost
with our design under different maximum lengths of deferrable
(a) (b)
Fig. 3. Normalized results of a DC with our design and server shutdown:
(a) Peak electricity load, (b) Electricity cost.
periods of time, i.e., D. Fig. 2 shows the normalized results
with respect to the results of Baseline.
Three information can be found from Fig. 2: 1) With the
increasing of the maximum length of deferrable periods of
time, our design can shed the DC’s peak electricity load and
reduce its overall electricity cost more effectively. 2) When the
maximum length of deferrable periods is relatively large, e.g.,
larger than 10 time slots as shown in Fig. 2, the effectiveness
of our design cannot be greatly increased via further increasing
the maximum length of deferrable periods of time. 3) DC
with our design always outperforms the one without any
DR programs and incentive mechanisms. For example, when
D = 10, the DC with data traces of Youtube U.S. can shed its
peak electricity load by 20.9% and reduce its overall electricity
cost by 7.4%.
B. Impact of Server Shutdown and Local Renewable Energy
Generation
We integrate our design with another emerging practical DR
strategy: server shutdown or local renewable energy genera-
tion, and evaluate their performances. Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show
the normalized results of a DC with server shutdown and local
renewable energy generation, respectively. Here, the base for
both normalizations is the results of Baseline. Specifically, the
DC as shown in Fig. 4 is equipped with several wind turbines
and the wind speed data is gathered from January 1, 2012 to
January 30, 2012 and is available in [24]. By analyzing Fig. 3
and 4, the three information found in section VI-A still hold.
Moreover, By comparing Fig. 3 and 4 against Fig. 2, we find
that the peak electricity load and the overall electricity cost of
a DC with our design can be further reduced via integrating
with other DR strategies such as server shutdown and local
renewable energy generation.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed time-varying rewards to incen-
tivize users of DCs grant time-shifting of their requests. Our
design is non-intrusive, deadline aware and easy to understand.
Moreover, our reward system is fair and we can provide users
with max-cost guarantee. With a game-theoretic framework,
we modeled the game between users and a single DC and
formulated/solved the problem of minimization of the DC’s
electricity cost without reducing its profit. With real-world
data traces, we showed that our design can greatly reduce
(a) (b)
Fig. 4. Normalized results of a DC with our design and local renewable
energy generation: (a) Peak electricity load, (b) Electricity cost.
the DC’s peak electricity load and overall electricity cost.
We also extended our design to another emerging practical
scenario where the DC has employed workload time-shifting
and server shutdown or local renewable energy generation
simultaneously. Accordingly, our design can apply to a DC
with different combinations of DR strategies.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Apparently, ∀i, t, from (1), if a user does not grant time-
shifting of its requests, its surplus at time time slot t, which
is referred to as SNoi [t], equals
SNoi [t] = λi[t](Vi[t]− δi[t]). (24)
On the contrary, if the user decides to participate in the DR
programs, its surplus at time slot t, which is referred to as
SY esi [t], is
SY esi [t] = λi[t](Vi[t]− δi[t]) + λˆi[t](γ[t]− κi[t]), (25)
where λˆi[t] denotes amount of deferred requests generated by
user i at time slot t. Note, since DC makes the decision of
whether to defer part or all of the users requests if the user
grant time-shifting of its requests, the user cannot perfectly
predict how many requests will be deferred but can ensure
that 0 ≤ λˆi[t] ≤ λi[t].
Next, we prove that Theorem 1 is correct in two complemen-
tary cases: First, ∀i, t, if γ[t] > κi[t], SNoi [t] ≤ SY esi [t].
Namely, in this case, the dominant strategy for the user is
to join in the DR programs. Second, ∀i, t, if γ[t] ≤ κi[t],
SNoi [t] ≥ SY esi [t], and thus the optimal choice for the user is
not to participate in the DR program in this case. 
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
First, we can easily obtain that ∀t, γ∗[t] ≥ Lb[t]. Second,
from (14), we have ∀t,
D∑
d=1
ηd[t] ≤ pi[t]λ[t] =⇒
(Ub[t]− Lb[t])∑Dd=1 ηd[t]
pi[t]λ[t]
≤ Ub[t]− Lb[t] =⇒
γ∗[t] ≤ Ub[t].
Meanwhile, γ∗[t] satisfy constraint (14) of problem (17). Thus,
γ∗[t] is a feasible solution of γ[t] of problem (17). Next,
we prove Theorem 2 by contradiction. Assume that γ∗[t] is
not an optimal solution of γ[t] of problem (17) and let γc[t]
denote the true optimal solution of γ[t] of problem (17). From
(3), Cost|γ[t]=γc[t] = Cost|γ[t]=γ∗[t], which contradicts the
assumption that γ∗[t] is not an optimal solution of γ[t] of
problem (17). 
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